Certifier en situation d'incertitude : le cas des OGM

Certifying in a context of uncertainty: the case of GMOs

¹ Sociologue, CEMAGREF Grenoble, DTM, 2 rue de la Papeterie, BP 76, 38402 Saint-Martin-d'Hères cedex, France,
² Économiste, directeur de recherche, INRA,Unité SAD-APT, 16 rue Claude Bernard, 75231 Paris cedex, France

Auteur de correspondance : C. Granjou celine.granjou@free.fr

Reçu : 20 Novembre 2003
Accepté : 2 Septembre 2004

Résumé

La crédibilité de la garantie apportée par la certification provient en principe de l'expertise indépendante de l'organisme de contrôle. Dans le cas de l'information sur la caractéristique OGM ou non OGM des produits agroalimentaires, ces conditions sont insuffisantes, faute de méthodes de contrôle jugées fiables. L'article analyse le fonctionnement de la certification dans ces conditions. Il montre que son succès relatif repose, plutôt que sur une véritable clôture de la controverse sur les preuves de l'"absence" d'OGM, sur un compromis conventionnel entre les exigences des entreprises clientes et les investissements consentis par les fournisseurs. Le recours à la certification constitue un mécanisme de régulation privée considéré, au moins localement et temporairement, comme suffisant pour ne pas remettre en cause incessamment les échanges commerciaux, et en tout cas plus satisfaisant que la seule intervention des pouvoirs publics.

Abstract

The credibility and guarantee attached to the certification process theoretically results from the control company's independence and expertise. In the case of information on the GMO or non GMO nature of the food and agricultural products, these conditions are insufficient for lack of a stabilized definition of the control methods. However, professionals in the supply chain often turn to certification companies in order to ensure greater reliability for their exchanges concerning this information. Our paper analyses the way certification works in these situations. Certification companies are shown to use knowledge and agreements constructed by the actors concerned; they work on formalizing the good intentions of the certified industrialists and finally offer a guarantee on industrial practices based on their own reputation. Rather than supplying a definitive and universal conclusion to the controversy about proofs of GMO "absence", certification companies provide a local compromise between the demands for proof from the customer companies and the investments consented by the suppliers. Resorting to certification then constitutes sufficient proof for the industrialists, a sort of conventional agreement. Certification is a private regulating mechanism which is considered sufficient, at least locally and temporarily, not to continuously endanger the necessary coordination for market exchanges: in any case it is considered more satisfactory than the one-sided intervention of public authorities.